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The Canadian Experiment with Voluntary 
Incomes Restraint, Degree of Labour 
Organization and Cyclical Sensitivity 
of Employment 
William D. Walsh 
This paper provides a measure of the industrial distri-
bution of the employment impact of monetary and fiscal poli-
cies and suggests that organized labour could hâve expected 
to hâve realized very Unie differential employment benefits 
from the Commissions package of proposais — priées and 
incomes restraint in combination with less monetary and 
fiscal restraint than would otherwise be possible. 
INTRODUCTION 
During 1969 and 1970 Canada's Priées and Incomes Commission 
strongly advocated a programme of voluntary priées and incomes restraint. 
The rationale for this proposai ' was 
that sueh restraint would permit less 
restrictive monetary and fiscal po-
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1
 This argument received continuing prominence in the Commission's public 
discussions of their objectives. See, for example, addresses delivered by John H. 
YOUNG, Chairman, Priées and Incomes Commission to : the Empire Club of 
Toronto, Toronto, October 30, 1969 (mimeographed) ; the Conférence on Labour 
Relations in the Quasi-Public Sector, Montréal, November 6, 1969 (mimeographed) ; 
Labour Relations and Workshop Conférence, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, February 
25, 1970 (mimeographed) ; Ontario Fédération of Printing Trade Unions, Ottawa, 
Ontario, May 2, 1970 (mimeographed) ; Joint Annual Luncheon of The Canadian 
Manufacturers' Association (Québec Division and Montréal District Branch), Mont-
réal, Québec, May 6, 1970 (mimeographed) ; Annual Meeting of the Canadian Eco-
nomies Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 4, 1970 (mimeographed) ; Vancouver 
Board of Trade, Vancouver, B.C., September 14, 1970 (mimeographed) ; Ontario 
Fédération of Construction Associations, Toronto, Ontario, March 10, 1971 (mi-
meographed) ; Association of Professional Economists of British Columbia, Van-
couver, B.C., April 28, 1971 (mimeographed) ; Edmonton Rotary Club, Edmonton, 
Alta., July 22, 1971 (mimeographed). See also Priées and Incomes Commission, 
Inflation, Unemployment and Incomes Policy, Summary Report, Ottawa, 1972, pp. 
48, 5L 
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licies than would otherwise be possible, while at the same time avoiding 
some of the difficulties associated with while at the same time avoiding 
some of the difficulties associated with compulsory price and wage controls. 
In effect, the Commission's argument was that government policy-
makers in combatting inflation face a type of « trade-off » between con-
ventional monetary and fiscal policies and incomes policies. The output 
and employment costs of curbing an unacceptable rate of inflation dépend 
upon the extent to which labour, business and other sectors of the econ-
omy can be persuaded to voluntarily restrain their money income de-
mands. 2 In this respect, one may argue that the larger the élément of 
coopération in the incomes restraint programme and the smaller the 
élément of compulsion, the more important is it that the self-interest of 
the parties to the agreement, principally business and labour, be identified 
with the success of the agreement.3 The larger the benefits accruing to 
the parties to the agreement and the more clearly they are perceived 
the more readily do the guidelines become self-enforcing, even self-acti-
vating. 4 
In terms of the self-interest of organized labour, the Commission's 
proposais offered the prospect of higher than otherwise employment 
2
 In developing this thème, the Commission clearly did not mean that incomes 
policies would permit the adoption of easy monetary and fiscal policies, but only 
that an incomes policy would permit a given measure of inflation control with less 
restrictive than otherwise monetary and fiscal policies. 
3
 It should be noted that the Commission had in mind a somewhat limited form 
of voluntarism. That is, the criteria for the assessment of excessive price and income 
increases were to be voluntarily and cooperatively arrived at. But such an agreement 
was also to include appropriate provision for review and surveillance procédures. 
It was also expected that various forms of government intervention and pressure 
would hâve to be employed to ensure gênerai compliance with the agreement (see, 
for example, Address delivered by John H. YOUNG, Chairman, Priées and Incomes 
Commission, to the Retail Crédit Men's Association, Vancouver, B.C., November 3, 
1970 (mimeographed)). The Commission's approach, then, is distinguishable from 
a mandatory control programme not by the complète absence of coercion, but rather 
by the relative degree of coercion. This much being recognized, it remains that the 
Commission stressed consensus agreement by the parties concerned and substantial 
voluntary coopération with the agreement. 
4 For example, the Commission was ultimately successful in working out an 
agreement with the business community to hold price increases in 1970 below what 
would be necessary to fully cover cost increases. This agreement can be interpreted 
as an acceptance by business of a squeeze on unit profit margins in return for the 
higher sales volume and total profits that could be expected from the prospect of 
less restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. 
392 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 30, NO 3 
levels.5 The magnitude of this employment benefit to the labour move-
ment dépends upon the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy 
and the level of total employment and, since the extent of unionization 
varies by industry, upon the industrial distribution of the employment 
impact of changes in monetary and fiscal policies. 6 
Additionally, it can be argued that the steadfast refusai of organized 
labour to cooperate with the Commission in the formulation of a wage 
guideline programme enhances the importance of the distributional as-
pects of the employment impact of the promised easier monetary and 
fiscal policies. That is, the stronger is the opposition of organized labour 
to incomes restraint that the policy-makers wish to overcome, the larger 
must be the degree of monetary and fiscal relaxation and/or the more 
pronounced must be the impact of a given degree of monetary and fiscal 
easing on the organized sectors of the economy. 7 To the extent that an 
5
 As seen by the trade union movement the Commission's proposais also meant 
lower than otherwise wage levels (see Method of Analysis section below). The 
procédure of this paper is to take thèse lower wage levels as given and to ask the 
question what employment gains might hâve accrued to organized labour by ac-
cepting this lower wage. For the purposes of this paper, it is therefore not necessary 
to order the union movement's préférences for wages versus employment or other 
dimensions of the employment relationship. Only in the extrême and unlikely case 
where unions seek to maximize the wage rate irrespective of the employment 
repercussions would the size of the potential employment benefits offered by the 
Commission's proposais be of neither a priori nor empirical interest. For a fuller 
discussion of union préférences in terms of the trade-off between wages and em-
ployment see Allan M. CARTTER, Theory of Wages and Employment, Richard 
D. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1959, Chs. 7 and 8, particularly, pp. 86-94,, See also 
footnotes 7 and 8 below. 
6
 Clearly, the distribution as well as the magnitude of the impact of monetary 
and fiscal policies are relevant to the labour movement. For example, on the 
extrême assumption that monetary and fiscal measures corne to rest entirely on 
employment levels in the unorganized portion of the labour force, the labour 
movement's attitude to the direction of thèse policies in terms of organized labour's 
employment interests would be one of indifférence. 
7 The rejection of the Commission's proposais by the Canadian Labour Con-
gress (and Confédération of National Trade Unions) obviously means that in 
weighing the benefits and costs of the Commission's policy package organized labour 
could see no net advantage in thèse proposais. This, however, clearly does not 
detract from the a priori importance of the question posed by this paper. 
For the main éléments of the Canadian Labour Congress' opposition to volun-
tary restraint see the following section and the conclusion of this paper. For a 
more complète statement of the CLC's position see Canadian Labour Congress, 
Memorendum to the Government of Canada, March 23, 1970, Ottawa, Canada, 
p. 26. 
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inflationary climate constrains the range of monetary and fiscal relax-
ation, the potential significance of the employment distribution effects 
of the Commission's proposais is considerably increased. 
This paper provides a measure of the industrial distribution of the 
employment impact of monetary and fiscal policies and suggests that 
organized labour could hâve expected to hâve realized very little différ-
entiel employment benefits from the Commission's package of proposais 
— priées and incomes restraint in combination with less monetary and 
fiscal restraint than would otherwise be possible.8 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The Commission's appeal for a programme of voluntary wage guide-
lines was directed to labour generally, but the key to its gênerai accepta-
bility was the reaction of organized labour. Which means that the relevant 
inducement mechanism relates not so much to employment benefits 
generally, but to employment benefits for organized labour. When the 
labour movement argued that wages restraint programmes are unwork-
able and inéquitable 9 what they presumably had uppermost in mind was 
the risk that organized labour's money wage rate would fall relative to 
the money priées received by ail other factors of production. On this 
basis, the labour movement might reasonably expect to share dispropor-
tionately in the employment gains of the programme. Or alternatively, 
the stronger the association between gênerai économie conditions and the 
employment prospects of organized labour, the more closely is the self-
interest of organized labour identified with an inflation-control program-
me of the type envisioned by the Commission — voluntary income res-
traint combined with some relaxation of monetary and fiscal restraint. 
Whatever the lag structure of the economy, the impact of changes 
in monetary and fiscal policy is ultimately registered in the economy by 
changes in the rate of growth of the major économie aggregates — most 
importantly for the purposes of this paper, in total employment. Ceteris 
paribus, monetary and fiscal expansion, or less restraint, at less than full 
8 In focusing on the industrial distribution of employment changes, this paper, 
of course, does not deny the importance to the labour movement's objectives of 
the total employment effect or possible income distribution effects of the Com-
mission's proposed programme. The intention hère is simply to isolate analytically 
one of the several aspects of the Commission's package of policies that are poten-
tially relevant to the interests of the labour movement. 
9
 Canadian Labour Congress, op. cit., p. 26., 
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employment will eventually mean higher levels of total employment. In 
thèse circumstances, the nature of the differential employment benefits 
to organized labour from less restrictive monetary and fiscal policies can 
be approximated by the relationship between changes in total employ-
ment and employment changes in the more organized sectors of the 
economy. 
Trade unions tend to be more strongly represented in the heavy in-
dustry sectors of the economy 10 and, therefore, a positive relationship 
between degree of union organization and cyclical sensitivity of employ-
ment might be expected. However, the main objective of this paper is 
to provide a measure of the differential employment benefits that might hâve 
been realized by organized labour from subscribing to the Commission^ pro-
gramme. In this context, not only are the direction and statistical signif-
icance of the relationship between degree of labour organization and cy-
clical sensitivity of employment by industry important, but also, of even 
more stratégie importance is the overall strength (R2) of this association. 
What is required, then, is a measure of the extent to which the em-
ployment conditions of the organized portions of the labour force reflect 
the gênerai ebb and flow of économie activity. Employment conditions 
in particular industries of the economy are measured by indexes of em-
ployment n and average weekly hours worked12 ; gênerai économie 
conditions are measured by employment indexes and average weekly 
hours for the aggregate of the particular industries. 
Over any period of time the annual observations on an employment 
index 13 reflect the combined influence of trend variables and cyclical-
10
 See the percent unionization data in Tables 1A and 2A of the Statistical 
Appendix. 
11
 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Review of Employment and Average Weekly 
Wages and Salaries (Cat. 72-201) (Ottawa, various issues, 1961-70). Thèse em-
ployment index data cover both wage-earner and salaried employées in establish-
ments employing twenty or more employées and are based in 1961. For several 
industries the employment indexes were obtained from a spécial request to Statistics 
Canada. 
12 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Review of Man-Hours and Hourly Earnings 
(Cat. 72-202) (Ottawa, various issues, 1961-70). The average weekly hours data 
report hours worked by hourly-rated wage-earners in establishments employing 
twenty or more employées. For a more detailed définition of the hours data see 
the source publication. For several industries the average weekly hours data were 
obtained from a spécial request to Statistics Canada. 
13
 The analysis of average weekly hours parallels that of the indexes of em-
ployment and it needs not be developed separately. 
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plus-irregular variables (treated hère as the cyclical component). In or-
der to measure the cyclical sensitivity of employment in any particular 
industry the trend magnitude must be separated from the cyclical mag-
nitude. Trend équations of the following form are fitted (in natural log-
arithms) to the employment index data for each of the n industries 
r.t 
E. = Ae1 (1), 
where Ej (i = 1 , . . . ,n) is the annual average of the employment index 
in industry i, ^ is the average annual rate of growth in employment in 
industry i and t measures time in years.14 
Since the central relationship in the analysis of this paper is that 
between the cyclical pattern in particular industries and the gênerai or 
overall cyclical pattern, we need to fit a trend équation of the above form 
to the aggregate of the n industries ; 
E ^ A e 1 (2), 
where EL is the annual average of the employment index for the aggre-
gate of the n industries, rr is the average annual rate of growth in em-
ployment in the aggregate of the n industries and t measures time in 
years.15 
The cyclical sensitivity of each industry can now be measured by 
the following équation ; 
Ei
 =
 b
~ ' -^— • (3), 
where Eic is the calculated trend value of the employment index in the 
ith industry ; EIC is the calculated trend value of the aggregate employ-
E. ET 
ment index and—— and—-—are, respectively, cyclical relatives for in-
E i c E I C 
14 Since the trend in average weekly hours data is much less perceptible than 
in the case of the employment index data, the most appropriate trend équation is 
linear rather than exponential. Specifically, the trend équation (1) for the average 
weekly hours data in each of the n industries is ; 
H i = ao + M» 
where Hi (i = 1 , . . . , n) is the annual average of average weekly hours in industry 
i and t measures time in years. 
15
 Equation (2) for the average weekly hours data is Hj = a0 + att, where 
Hj is the annual average of average weekly hours in the aggregate of the n industries 
and t measures time in years. 
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dustry i and for the aggregate of the n industries.16 The bi coefficient 
defines a cyclical employment elasticity coefficient that measures the per-
centage responsiveness of déviations from trend employment in industry 
i with respect to a given percentage déviation from the aggregate employ-
ment trend.17 
In gênerai, déviations from trend in any particular industry are ex-
plained by swings in the overall state of économie activity and/or short 
run disturbances unique to the particular industry. On the other hand, 
déviations from the aggregate trend, given a relatively high level of ag-
gregation, are explained primarily by cyclical movements in total écon-
omie activity. Industries with high elasticity coefficients are industries 
whose employment levels are sensitive to gênerai économie conditions or, 
alternatively, are industries in which spécial factors tend to be strongly 
associated with gênerai économie conditions. Conversely, low elasticity 
coefficients reflect the absence of cyclical sensitivity ; the offsetting impact 
of spécial factors and gênerai économie conditions ; or contra-cyclical 
sensitivity (négative elasticity coefficients). 
For the purposes of this study it is not essential to identify sepa-
rately the effects of short run spécial factors and gênerai économie con-
ditions. 18 What matters in terms of the inducement for organizeel labour 
16
 Since the left hand side of équation (3) is included in the right hand side 
of the équation there is the possibility of introducing spurious corrélation. In the 
following section, équation (3) is fitted to the eight major sectors of the industrial 
composite, the largest of which in 1970 are the manufacturing sector accounting 
for 26.9% of total industrial employment and the transportation, communication 
and other utilities sector accounting for 17.7% of total industrial employment 
(Thèse figures are calculated from data in Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Estimâtes 
of Employées by Province and Industry (Ottawa, Cat. no. 72-008). Thèse sectors 
are insufficiently large to dominate the average (the industrial composite) and the 
problem of spurious corrélation is, therefore, not important. This problem is even 
less relevant when équation (3) is applied to 57 industries in the manufacturing 
sector. 
H i - -u !7 Equation (3) for the average weekly hours data is -z= v& 
where the variables are defined in the same way as for the employment index 
équation given in the text. 
18
 It should be noted hère that structural changes among industries occur 
mainly over the longer term and are, therefore, reflected in the trend employment 
values calculated for each industry from équation (1). Thèse values serve as the 
base (E lc) in the left hand side of équation (3) and hence, the cyclical sensitivity 
measure is, in effect, « net » of structural change, or structural change « adjusted. » 
\ H , c / 
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to trade voluntary wage restraint for less gênerai économie restraint, is 
the perceived association between the gênerai state of the economy and 
employment conditions in particular unionized industries in the economy. 
Whether this association is direct, or indirect through the relationship 
between unique industry factors and gênerai économie conditions is of 
a second order of importance. 
On the basis of this model, the contribution that differential employ-
ment gains make to the self-interest of organized labour in an exchange 
of voluntary wage restraint for easier monetary and fiscal policies can 
now be approximated by the corrélation between industry employment 
elasticity coefficients and the level of unionism by industry. The more 
strongly positive is this corrélation, the greater is the proportion of the 
benefits of économie expansion accruing to organized labour, and, there-
fore, the stronger, ceteris paribus, is the inducement for the labour move-
ment to subscribe to a programme of wage and price restraint of the type 
proposed by the Priées and Incomes Commission. 
THE RESULTS 
This model is applied to the major sectors of the Canadian economy 
comprising the industrial composite 19 for the period 1961-197020 and 
to 57 three-digit manufacturing industries over the same time period. 
Major Sectors 
Over the period 1961-1970 total industrial employment, as measured 
by the industrial composite, grew at an average annual compound rate 
of 3.0%. The service sector was the most rapidly growing sector at 7.2% 
per annum while the forestry industry at —1.6% per annum was the 
slowest growth sector.21 
19
 The industrial composite excludes the public sector, agriculture, fishing and 
trapping, and is, therefore, essentially the private non-agriculture sector of the 
economy. Average weekly hours data on the major sectors of the industrial com-
posite are unavailable and the analysis of thèse major sectors is, therefore, restricted 
to the employment index data. 
20 Both 1961 and 1970 are years of cyclical weakness. For example, the 
overall unemployment rate in 1961 was at a high of 7.1% and in 1970 rose to 
5.9% from 4.7% in 1969. (Statistics Canada, The Labour Force (Ottawa, various 
issues)). 
21
 The employment growth rates in this paragraph are obtained from équa-
tions (1) and (2). The trend régression équations may be obtained by writing to 
the author. 
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The degree of responsiveness of annual déviations from sector trends 
to annual déviations from the aggregate (industrial composite) trend 
varies from the highly sensitive construction industry with an elasticity 
coefficient of 3.19 to the slightly contra-cyclical sensitivity of the finance 
sector with an elasticity coefficient of —0.15. 22 
Using régression techniques to correlate thèse sectoral employment 
elasticity coefficients with the extent of unionization by sector (U)23 
yields the following results (t-values in parenthèses). 
lh = 0.0181 + 0.0311U (4) 
(0.0296) (2.2065) 
R2 = 0.4480 
R2 = 0.3559 
The sensitivity of sectoral employment to gênerai économie expan-
sion (and contraction) is positively associated with the degree of union-
ism, but the relationship is not a strong one. Each percentage point in-
crease in the degree of unionism is associated with a 0.0311 increase in 
the employment elasticity coefficient (the degree of unionism régression 
coefficient is significant at the 0.10 confidence level) ; but considerably 
less than one half of the variation in the employment elasticity coefficient 
can be accounted for by variation in the degree of unionism.24 
22
 The sector employment elasticity calculations are from Table 1A of the 
Statistical Appendix. 
23
 The extent of unionization (U) is defined in note 1 of Table 1A in the 
Statistical Appendix. The results exclude the construction sector for which com-
parable unionization data are unavailable. Given the high employment elasticity 
coefficient of the construction sector and the relatively high degree of unionism 
in this sector, its inclusion in the analysis would probably improve the significance 
of équation (4). 
24
 Alternative measures of the degree of unionism fail to improve thèse 
results. When the U variable is measured with référence to sectoral employment 
given by the Labour Force Survey (rather than by the Establishment Employment 
Survey) équation (4) becomes (t-values in parenthèses) : 
b1 = 0.2285 +0.0284U 
(0.3239) (1.5407) 
R2 = 0.2835 
R2 = 0.1641 
And when the degree of unionism is measured by the number of unionized em-
ployées rather than by the percentage of employées who are unionized, équation (4) 
lacks any statistical significance whatsoever. 
The rank corrélation between degree of unionism and employment elasticity 
(U and b , respectively, from Table 1A in the Statistical Appendix) yields a rank 
corrélation coefficient of 0.6071 which is not significant at the 0.05 confidence level. 
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Thèse findings provide some indication that employment in the 
more highly organized sectors of the economy is affected more than pro-
portionately by swings in gênerai économie activity. On this basis, there 
is an added incentive for organized labour as distinct from labour gene-
rally, to participate in a trade-off between less restrictive monetary and 
fiscal policies and voluntary money incomes restraint. However, it would 
also appear that the size of this additional inducement is not of major 
importance. 
The Manufacturing Sector 
From a simple quantitative point of view — number of union mem-
bers — manufacturing is the most important single sector of the economy 
to the labour movement. Manufacturing contains the largest number of 
union members by a margin of more than two-to-one. ^ 
In light of the key position of manufacturing, it seems entirely plau-
sible that the reaction of organized labour to a possible trade-off between 
incomes policies and monetary and fiscal policies will dépend more upon 
how cyclical movements in total manufacturing employment are distribut-
ed among individual manufacturing industries than upon how cyclical 
movements in total industrial employment are distributed among the ma-
jor industrial sectors of the economy. For this reason the model deve-
loped above is applied to 57 manufacturing industries for which com-
parable unionism, employment and average weeldy hours data are avail-
able for the 1961-1970 period. 
Average annual rates of growth in employment vary considerably 
among manufacturing industries during the 1961-1970 period.26 The 
most rapid rate of employment growth, 8.5% per annum, occurred in the 
Office and Store Machinery industry while at the other extrême, employ-
ment in the Fur Goods industry declined at a rate of 5.6% per annum. 
Similarly, the responsiveness of déviations from trend employment 
growth in manufacturing industries to déviations from trend employment 
25
 In 1969 total union membership was 2,074,616 ; union membership in the 
manufacturing sector was 765,049 ; and union membership in the next largest 
sector, transportation and utilities, was 362,828, Labour Gazette, Vol. 70, No. 3, 
March, 1970. 
26
 The employment growth rates for manufacturing industries are obtained 
from équations (1) and (2). The trend régression équations may be obtained by 
writing to the author. 
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growth in total manufacturing varies widely.27 Employment elasticity 
coefficients in manufacturing industries range from a high of 4.38 in the 
Agricultural Implements industry to a low of —0.73 in the Petroleum 
Rafineries industry. 
Using régression analysis to correlate this pattern of cyclical sensi-
tivity in the manufacturing sector to the pattern of unionism (U) 2S in 
this sector yields the following results (t-values in parenthèses). 
bi = -0.4737 + 0.0225U (5) 
(-1.0033) (3.5491) 
R2 = 0.186 
R2 = 0.172 
Although employment elasticity coefficients in the manufacturing 
sector are positively and significantly (the régression coefficient is sign-
ificant at the 0.001 confidence level) related to the degree of unionism 
(a one percentage point increase in the percentage of employment or-
ganized is associated with a 0.0225 increase in the employment elasticity 
coefficient), less than 20% of the variation in manufacturing industry 
employment elasticity coefficients is associated with variation in the de-
gree of unionism. 29 Highly unionized manufacturing industries are more 
susceptible to cyclical swings in total manufacturing activity than are 
lightly unionized manufacturing industries, but unionism and employment 
elasticities are not very importantly related in the manufacturing sector 
of the economy. 
Comparing thèse results with those obtained above for the major 
industrial sectors, it would appear that the differential employment in-
centive for unions concentrated in the manufacturing sector to cooperate 
with a programme of voluntary incomes restraint is even less than it is 
for the labour movement generally. 
27 See Table 2A of the Statistical Appendix. 
28
 See Note 1 of Table 2A in the Statistical Appendix for the source and 
définition of the unionism data. 
29
 Substituting the number of union members (number of non-office employées 
covered by collective agreements) for the percentage of employées organized (per-
centage of non-office employées covered by collective agreements) yields considerably 
less significant results than those presented in the text. Including office worker 
union membership data (percentage of office employées covered by collective 
agreements) in the analysis changes the results very little from those presented in 
the text. 
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Turning now to the analysis of the average weekly hours data for 
manufacturing industries, there is almost a complète absence of asso-
ciation between cyclical sensitivity in weekly hours and degree of union-
ism.30 When the hours-worked elasticity coefficients are correlated with 
the degree of unionism (U) the following équation is derived (t-values in 
parenthèses). 
bi = 0.5051 + 0.0056U (6) 
(1.2411 (1.0282) 
R2 = 0.019 
R2 = 0.001 
An increase in the degree of unionism is associated with a very small in-
crease in the cyclical sensitivity of hours worked in manufacturing indus-
tries. Thèse findings suggest that the relative distribution of cyclical varia-
tions in average weekly hours in manufacturing varies hardly, if at ail, 
between lightly unionized manufacturing industries and highly unionized 
manufacturing industries. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical analysis of this paper yields two main results : (1) 
In the major industrial sectors of the economy changes in the pace of 
gênerai économie activity during the 1960's tended to come to rest only 
somewhat more heavily on employment conditions in the most highly 
unionized sectors of the economy ; and (2) In the key manufacturmg 
sector of the economy the relationship between the degree of unionism 
and employment sensitivity to gênerai économie conditions is weak and 
among manufacturing industries there is virtually no relationship between 
the extent of unionism and the responsiveness of average weekly hours 
to swings in total manufacturing activity. 
On the basis of thèse findings it is difficult to be optimistic about 
the voluntary approach to the implementation of incomes policies.31 
30
 The average weekly hours trend équations (1) and (2) are specified above 
in footnotes 14 and 15. The trend régression analysis of the average weekly hours 
data for manufacturing industries may be obtained by writing to the author. The 
unionism data and hours elasticity calculations are given in Table 2A of the 
Statistical Appendix. 
31
 It should be clear that this point bears not so much on the merits of in-
comes policies as such as it does on the voluntary forms of incomes policies. 
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Voluntarism works best when the parties to the agreement can clearly 
identify their self-interest with its success. In the case of the Commission's 
programme, organized labour was offered the inducement of less restric-
tive than otherwise monetary and fiscal policies. Certainly the labour 
movement participâtes with the balance of the economy in any employ-
ment expansion or increase in average hours worked that follows from 
the introduction of easier monetary and fiscal policies. The analysis of 
this paper even indicates that the labour movement might be expected 
to gain somewhat more than proportionately from any policy-induced 
expansion in employment opportunities. However, the magnitude of this 
potential additional benefit accruing to organized labour does not appear 
to be sufficient to overcome any significant négative implications that 
the labour movement assigns to income control programmes. 
This conclusion clearly does not necessarily imply that the labour 
movement's rejection of the Commission's 1970 programme was based 
on the limited differential employment conséquences for the organized 
portion of the labour force promised by this programme. Organized labour 
strongjy opposed voluntary restraint as being unworkable, inéquitable and 
bad économie policy.32 Indeed, the strength of this opposition was pro-
bably such as to provide sufficient rationale for turning down the Com-
mission's proposais even without the leadership having any précise awar-
eness of the employment implications of thèse proposais. Or alternatively, 
the union movement's leadership may hâve decided that politically the 
government could not persist indefinitely with strongly anti-inflationary 
économie policies and that the labour movement's best strategy was to 
simply outwait the policy-makers. In either event, organized labour's 
rejection of the Commission's policy package is not inconsistent with the 
labour movement's self-interest as reflected in the relatively weak rela-
tionship between industry variations in degree of unionism and degree 
of cyclical sensitivity of employment conditions during the 1960's. 
In sum, the analysis of this paper provides additional support for 
the Commission's own ultimate conclusion that voluntarism can hâve 
only a limited rôle to play in the development of an effective incomes 
policy.33 
32
 Canadian Labour Congress, Mémorandum to the Government of Canada, 
March 23, 1970, Ottawa, Canada, p. 26. 
33
 See, for example, Price and Incomes Commission, Summary Report, op. cit., 
particularly, pp. 1-8 and 47-56. 
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Statistical Appendix : Elasticity Calculations 
and Degree of Unionism in Manufacturing Industries 
and Major Industrial Sectors 
TABLE 1A 
Percent Unionization, 1969, and Employment Elasticity, 
1961-1970, in Major Canadian Industrial Sectors 
Industrial Sector 
Percent 
Vnionized ! Employment Elasticity Calculations 2 
(U) vx / statistics-3 R2 
Forestry 65.6% 2.5629 4.9873 § 0.7566 
Mining (Mines, Quarries and 
Oil Wells) 44.5 0.2904 0.7553 0.0666 
Manufacturing 45.2 1.4503 6.9192§ 0.8568 
Construction N.A. 3.1855 12.4735§ 0.9511 
Transportation, Communications 
and Other Utilities 54.7 0.4187 2,7466t 0.4853 
Trade 8.7 0.5164 2.4493t 0.4285 
Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate 0.6 -0.1531 -1.7396 0.2744 
Service 11.8 0.8867 2.1995* 0.3768 
1 The percent of total employment that is unionized in each industrial sector 
is calculated from union membership given in The Labour Gazette, vol. 70, no. 3, 
March 1970, and employment data from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Estimâtes 
of Employées by Province and Industry (Cat. 72-008) (Ottawa, various issues, 1969-
1970). Both the union membership data and the employment data are based on 
the DBS Standard Industrial Classification (1960). 
2
 The employment elasticity équation (3), = b when 
fitted in natural logarithm form by ordinary least squares régression techniques 
becomes, InE. — InE = lnb + b. (lnET - InE ï + u, where E. is the 
i ic o 1 I IC i 
observed value of the employment index in sector i, E ic is the calculated (from 
équation (1)) trend value of the employment index in sector i, Ex is the observed 
value of the employment index in the industrial composite, E1C is the calculated 
(from équation (2)) trend value of the employment index in the industrial com-
posite, bj is the employment elasticity coefficient in sector i and u is the random 
error term. 
3
 The significance of the hx coefficient in a two-tailed test is identified as 
follows : §, significant at the 0.01 level of confidence ; t, significant at the 0.05 
level of confidence; and *, significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
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TABLE 2A 
Percent Unionization i, 1969; Employment Elasticity Calculations 2>3, 
1961-1970; and Hours Elasticity Calculations45, 1961-1970, for Selected 
Canadian Manufacturing Industries 
Percent Employment Elasticity Hours Elasticity 
lndustry Unionization i 1 Calculations 2>3,6 Calculations^ 6 
bi R2 bi R2 
Slaughtering and Méat 
Processing 86 0.2442 0.2124 0.72371" 0.4040 
Dairy Factories 70 0.6918§ 0.7025 -0.5887* 0.3349 
Fish Products 61 0.7155 î 0.4204 3.9096§ 0.6032 
Grain Mill Products 68 -0.4422 0.2401 1.04901 0.5182 
Biscuits 76 0.4515§ 0.7123 -0.3032 0.0676 
Bakeries 59 0.7413§ 0.9116 0.3656 0.1939 
Confectionery 56 1.3348§ 0.8773 0.3927 0.2997 
Soft Drinks 43 0.69301 0.4320 1.8298§ 0.8097 
Breweries 98 0.0290 0.0065 1.0810 0.1107 
Tobacco Products 91 0.2623 0.2473 -1.8203§ 0.8138 
Rubber Footwear 67 1.9815* 0.3405 0.2461 0.0539 
Rubber Tires and Tubes 98 0.8618§ 0.6363 1.24101" 0.5299 
Other Rubber Products 85 2.6185§ 0.7515 0.8027f 0.4798 
Leather Tanneries 80 0.2894 0.0933 0.4091 0.1202 
Shoe Factories 48 0.4624 * 0.3614 0.2237 0.0583 
Cotton Yarn and Cloth 94 1.4516t 0.5672 1.7208§ 0.6651 
Woolen Yarn and Cloth 71 1.57981" 0.4933 0.4213 0.0902 
Synthetic Textiles 77 2.0926§ 0.7783 -0.0761 0.0075 
Knitting Mills 31 0.7532§ 0.7227 1.0491§ 0.8011 
Men's Clothing 62 0.9156! 0.5422 0.78611 0.4208 
Women's Clothing 48 1.03075 0.8665 0.59941- 0.4385 
Children's Clothing 26 0.5018* 0.3505 0.3613 0.1391 
Fur Goods 39 -0.5057 0.1687 -1.1216 0.1918 
Saw, Shingle and Planing 
Mills 67 0.3523 0.1364 0.8667t 0.4803 
Veneer and Plywood Mills 89 2.4201§ 0.7022 0.9938* 0.3252 
Sash, Door and Flooring 
Mills 60 0.0916 0.0114 1.6134§ 0.7943 
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TABLE 2A (Continued) 
Percent Employment Elasticity Hours Elasticity 
Unionîzation Industry 1 Calculations 2,3,6 
bj R2 
Calculations 4>5>6 
Household, Office and 
Other Fumiture 
Pulp and Paper Mills 
Paper Boxes and Bags 
Commercial Printing 
Printing and Publishing 
Iron and Steel Mills 
Iron Foundries 
Smelting and Refining 
Boiler and Plate Works 
Structural, Ornamental and 
Architectural Métal 
Métal Stamping, 
Pressing and Coating 
Wire and Wire Products 
Heating Equipment 
Machine Shops 
Agricultural Implements 
Miscellaneous Machinery 
and Equipment 
Office and Store 
Equipment 
Aircraft and Parts 
Motor Vehicles 
Motor Vehicle Parts and 
Accessories 
Railroad Rolling Stock 
Shipbuilding and Repair 
Small Electrical Appliances 
Major Appliances (Electric 
and Non-electric 
Household Radio and 
Télévision Receivers 
52 
95 
81 
50 
59 
81 
86 
99 
83 
81 
70 
80 
50 
36 
90 
81 
1.4208§ 
0.5815§ 
0.3542t 
0.0458 
0.2756 
1.1968t 
1.6470§ 
0.3258 
1.3943f 
1.6459§ 
1.3376§ 
1.5714§ 
0.8007§ 
2.0731§ 
4.3807§ 
1.9317§ 
0.9508 
0.7322 
0.5269 
0.0082 
0.2107 
0.5229 
0.9141 
0.0604 
0.4752 
0.5953 
0.9431 
0.8900 
0.8252 
0.6947 
0.8917 
0.8861 
0.9796§ 
0.9504§ 
1.3099§ 
1.2408§ 
0.8417* 
0.61901 
1.9198§ 
0.3124 
1.9967§ 
1.00161 
0.6058f 
1.5615§ 
1.00171-
1.5865§ 
1.7788§ 
2.2203 § 
R2 
0.7629 
0.7575 
0.8178 
0.8277 
0.3815 
0.5456 
0.7958 
0.2821 
0.6362 
0.5268 
0.5574 
0.7307 
0.4764 
0.8234 
0.7490 
0.8780 
19 -0.5770 0.1678 0.9612 0.1616 
93 1.2486 0.1632 0.4945 0.1028 
99 3.1756§ 0.7913 1.7071 0.2918 
91 2.8060§ 0.8863 2.0877t 0.5816 
97 4.2148§ 0.7011 1.6349t 0.5478 
95 4.1669§ 0.8529 1.4331§ 0.6477 
83 1.7386§ 0.8233 -0.0474 0.0007 
89 1.9063§ 0.8194 0.7439* 0.3790 
85 0.1613 0.0059 1.84561- 0.5514 
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TABLE 2A (Concluded) 
Percent Employment Elasticity Hours Elasticity 
Ituiustrv Unionization 1 Calculations 2,3,6 Calculations 4>5«6 
R2 w R2 w 
Communications Equipment 71 1.1294v 0.4232 0.2143 0.0758 
Electrical Industrial 
Equipment 88 1.5011§ 0.7709 1.5555§ 0.8203 
Petroleum Refineries 61 -0.7309f 0.5189 0.6738 0.3020 
Pharmaceuticals, Medicines 
and Toilet Préparations 14 0.3833* 0.3414 -0.0164 0.0024 
Paint and Varnish 61 0.0599 0.0078 1.4923§ 0.8549 
Industrial Chemicals 92 0.6903§ 0.6193 0.1520 0.0488 
1
 The percentage unionization in each industry is measured by the « percen-
tage of non-office employées covered by collective agreements ». Thèse data 
are obtained from a survey of establishments employing 20 or more employées 
and are classified according to the DBS Standard Industrial Classification (1960). 
See Canada Dept. of Labour, Working Conditions in Canadîan Indusîry, 1969 
(Ottawa, 1970). 
2 For the source and définition of the employment data see footnote 7 in the 
text. 
Ei / Ej \ bj 
3
 The employment elasticity équation (3),~p~" — b 0 ( "p—J , when fitted 
in natural logarithm form by ordinary least squares régression techniques becomes, 
InEi — In EiC = In b0 -f bx (In E r — In E I C) + u, where Ei is the ob-
served value of the employment index in manufacturing industry i, Eic is the 
calculated (from équation (1)) trend value of the employment index in manu-
facturing industry i, Ef is the observed value of the employment index in total 
manufacturing, E tc is the calculated (from équation (2)) trend value of the 
employment index in total manufacturing, b1 is the employment elasticity coefficient 
in industry i and u is the random error term. 
4
 For the source and définition of the hours data see footnote 8 in the text. 
Hi _ . / Hj \ bx 
5 The hours worked elasticity équation ( 3 ) , T F " — "o 17— , when fitted 
"tic \ ^IC / 
in natural logarithm form by ordinary least squares régression techniques becomes, 
InHi — l n Hic = In b 0 + bx (InHj — lnH Ï C) + u, where Hj is the ob-
served value of hours worked in industry i, H ic is the calculated (from équation 
(1)) trend value of hours worked in industry i, H^ is observed value of hours 
worked in total manufacturing, H I C is the calculated (from équation (2)) trend 
value of hours worked in total manufacturing, b1 is the hours worked elasticity 
coefficient in industry i and u is the random error term. 
6 The significance of the b t coefficient in a two-tailed test is as follows: §, 
significant at the 0.01 level of confidence; t, significant at the 0.05 level of 
confidence; and *, significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
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L'expérience canadienne en matière de restriction 
volontaire des revenus 
L'article précédent fait ressortir deux choses. D'une part, dans les secteurs 
primordiaux de l'industrie, les changements dans le rythme de l'activité économi-
que en général pendant la décennie 1960 n'ont eu tendance à s'immobiliser un 
peu plus fortement en matière de conditions d'embauché que dans les secteurs 
les plus syndiqués de l'économie; d'autre part, dans le secteur clé de l'industrie 
manufacturière, le rapport entre le taux de syndicalisation et la rapidité de la 
réaction aux conditions économiques générales est faible et on n'y décèle presque 
pas de relation entre le taux de syndicalisation et les variations de la moyenne 
des heures travaillées par rapport aux oscillations de l'activité manufacturière dans 
son ensemble. 
En se fondant sur ces constatations, il est difficile d'être optimiste sur l'effi-
cacité d'une politique de contrôle volontaire des revenus. Le volontarisme fonc-
tionne mieux lorsque les parties contractantes peuvent assimiler d'une façon nette 
leurs propres intérêts au succès de cette politique. En ce qui concerne le program-
me de la Commission, celle-ci s'est montrée moins restrictive à l'endroit du mou-
vement syndical qu'à l'endroit des politiques financières et monétaires. Évidem-
ment, le mouvement syndical profite tout comme le reste de l'économie de 
l'expansion de l'emploi et de l'accroissement de la moyenne des heures travaillées 
qui résultent de politiques financières et monétaires moins restrictives. Les consta-
tations de cette étude indiquent même que le mouvement syndical peut espérer y 
gagner proportionnellement davantage par une politique qui favorise la croissance 
des occasions d'emploi. Cependant, l'ampleur de cet avantage potentiel qui revient 
au mouvement syndical ne semble pas suffisant pour compenser les effets négatifs 
que celui-ci attribue aux programmes de contrôle des revenus. 
Cette conclusion ne signifie pas nécessairement que le rejet par le monde 
syndical du programme de la Commission pour l'année 1970 était fondé sur les 
résultats limités des changements dans l'embauche pour la fraction syndiquée de la 
main-d'oeuvre. Le monde syndical s'est fortement opposé à la politique de res-
triction volontaire parce qu'il la considérait impraticable, inéquitable et économi-
quement mauvaise. En réalité, la fermeté de cette opposition fut probablement 
telle qu'elle devint une raison suffisante pour faire mettre de côté les suggestions 
de la Commission, même sans qu'on n'ait eu aucune idée précise de leurs consé-
quences. Il se peut aussi que les dirigeants du monde syndical puissent avoir jugé 
que, politiquement, le gouvernement ne persisterait pas indéfiniment dans son 
dessein de maintenir des mesures économiques anti-inflationnistes et que la meil-
leure stratégie du monde syndical était simplement de circonvenir ceux qui 
avaient formulé ces mesures. À tout événement, le rejet par le monde syndical 
des suggestions proposées n'est pas incompatible avec les intérêts du mouvement 
syndical comme la chose ressort du rapport assez faible qui existe entre le taux 
de syndicalisation des différents types d'industries, d'tune part, et l'intensité 
des réactions cycliques des conditions de l'embauche au cours de la décennie 1960. 
En résumé, cette étude confirme dans l'ensemble la propre conclusion de la 
Commission selon laquelle le volontarisme ne peut jouer qu'un rôle limité dans 
la mise en place d'une politique efficace des revenus. 
